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Summary: The present experiment examined whether people could be deterred from lying in an online insurance claim setting. A
total of 96 participants were asked to submit a theft insurance claim. Reﬂecting real life, submitting a claim that went beyond the
actual costs of the stolen items was associated with advantages and disadvantages. Two deterrence factors were introduced: ask-
ing claimants to provide evidence that they actually owned the stolen items (Evidence Instruction, often used by insurers) and ask-
ing participants to read out before starting to submit the claim that they will be truthful (Honesty Statement, not often used by
insurers). We also examined at what stage of the interview claimants embedded their lies in their otherwise truthful stories. The
honesty statement but not the evidence instruction made claimants more honest, and participants lied more as the interview
progressed.Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
For many decades, forensic deception research primarily fo-
cused on police–suspect interviews (Vrij & Granhag, 2012,
2014). Recently, it has been argued that other domains
neglected in deception research are equally important, such
as lying in intelligence interviews (Brandon, 2011; Loftus,
2011). Another important but neglected area is lie detection
in ﬁnancial settings. For example, the Association of British
Insurers (ABI, 2009) reported that 20% of general insurance
holders in the UK said that they would consider making an
exaggerated or completely made up insurance claim in the
future. The ABI further estimated that undetected insurance
claims fraud totals £1.3bn a year in the UK in 2013, adding
£50 to the annual costs of individual policyholders (BBC,
2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-27608316).
Lie detection is difﬁcult. A meta-analysis of lie detection
research including 206 documents and 24 483 observers re-
vealed that observers classify correctly, on average, 54% of
truth tellers and liars (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). This is a
low percentage given that 50% accuracy can be expected
just by ﬂipping a coin. Other meta-analyses have shown
that individual differences in the ability to detect deceit
are minute and that the poor performance occurs across var-
ious groups of observers (Aamodt & Custer, 2006; Bond &
DePaulo, 2008).
If lie detection is so difﬁcult, can we then perhaps deter
people from lying? The research in this area is scarce, but re-
cently, Van ’t Veer, Stel, and van Beest (2014) found that
people can indeed be deterred from lying when ‘cognitive
load’ is imposed on them, that is, when the task of lying is
made more difﬁcult. In their study, participants rolled a die
and reported the outcomes while under high cognitive load
(memorising a string of eight letters) or low cognitive load
(two letters to memorise). The higher the score the partici-
pants reported, the more money they could earn. The re-
ported outcomes under low cognitive load were signiﬁcantly
higher than those under high cognitive load, suggesting that
the participants under low cognitive load lied more than the
participants under high cognitive load.
In the present experiment, we examined whether we could
deter people from lying when completing an insurance claim
regarding the theft of items. We know from life experience
that insurance companies ask claimants to provide evidence
that they actually owned the items they claimed for, ideally
by showing the receipt or alternatively by providing a photo
depicting the stolen item in their home. This policy makes
sense as it gives insurers insight into the costs and ownership
of the claimed items. Despite understanding the logic behind
this policy, we have doubt that this evidence factor is effec-
tive in deterring people from lying. The instruction does little
more than asking the claimant something they are already in-
clined to do. Claimants (honest and fraudulent alike) will un-
derstand that an insurer is more likely to pay if they provide
evidence. Honest claimants are therefore likely to hand over
the evidence if they have it. Liars typically tell a mixture of
truths and lies (Leins, Fisher, & Ross, 2013; Nahari, Vrij,
& Fisher, 2014). In an insurance context, this would mean
exaggerating, in part, true claim rather than fabricating the
entire claim. They then too are likely to submit evidence
for at least some items they will claim for.
Perhaps another approach will work: To invite the claim-
ant prior to starting to complete the form to declare that
she or he will complete the form truthfully. The theoretical
rationale for this ‘honesty’ factor is that it will focus the
claimant on him or herself while reading out this declaration,
which will stimulate self-awareness. In turn, self-awareness
initiates an automatic comparison of the self against ethical
and moral standards (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Because
people want to perceive themselves as moral (Aquino &
Reed, 2002), self-awareness makes someone behave accord-
ingly to their moral standards and ethical goals (Baumeister
& Heatherton, 1996), and avoiding being dishonest could
be the result.
Research has shown the efﬁcacy of the honesty factor in
deterring people from lying. In two studies (a ﬁeld study
and an experiment), participants signed a written honesty
statement prior to completing a form ‘I promise that the in-
formation I am providing is true’ or did so at the end of the
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form or not at all (Shu, Mazar, Gino, Ariely, & Bazerman,
2012). In the ‘honesty statement prior to the form condition’,
participants in the ﬁeld study admitted to have driven more
miles in their car in the previous year (an acknowledgement
that results in a higher premium), and participants in the lab-
oratory experiment claimed less income and less travel ex-
penses than participants in the other conditions (see also
Ariely [2012] for a discussion of the ﬁndings).
Providing such an honesty statement in advance also
raised the saliency to moral standards. Participants were pre-
sented with a list of word fragments and asked to ﬁll in the
blanks to make complete words by using the ﬁrst word that
came to mind (Shu et al., 2012). Three of these fragments
(_ _ R A L, _ I _ _ _ E, and E _ _ _ C _ _) could potentially
be completed by words related to ethics (moral, virtue and
ethical). Those in the honesty statement condition came up
with more words indicating moral standards (M=1.40) than
a control group (M=0.87). Although insurers and tax author-
ities typically ask claimants to sign an honesty statement,
they ask them to do this after the claimant completed the
form rather than before (Shu et al., 2012). They do this for
legal reasons as the statement and signature explicitly links
the claimant with the form she or he just completed. The
honesty declaration, however, only yielded an effect if it is
made before completing the claim (Shu et al., 2012).
In the present experiment, participants took part in an on-
line, verbal, automated insurance claim setting similar to an
automated, verbal, phone call system frequently used by
the ﬁnancial industry (e.g. banks and insurance companies).
In the experiment, we introduced the evidence instruction
factor that insurers typically use (‘provide evidence’) and
the honesty statement factor that they typically do not use
(asking participants to declare that they will be honest before
starting to complete the form). We predicted that the honesty
statement would deter people from lying more than the pro-
viding evidence instruction (Hypothesis 1).
Apart from the deterrence of deceit, we also examined the
moment when people lie. When being fraudulent while com-
pleting an insurance claim, people could lie during the entire
claim or could tell a mixture of truths and lies, for example,
by reporting some items that were really stolen but then to
add to the list some made up items to boost their claim. Also,
in other situations (e.g. job interviews and intelligence
interviews), people could tell a mixture of truths and lies.
A relevant question hereby is when people are most likely
to lie when they report a mixture of truths and lies. This is
relevant, because if an investigator knows when someone
is most likely (or least likely) to lie, it could help him or
her in detecting these lies. To our knowledge, the issue of
when people lie when they tell a mixture of truths and lies
has never been examined.
We thought it to be likely that most people will not start an
interview with a lie. Most people probably ﬁrst would like to
familiarise themselves with the situation to see how the in-
vestigator responds or what the lie detection tool (if used)
looks like. Another reason to postpone lying is to gain
trust from the investigator. Indeed, once people are trustwor-
thy, they will put less effort in lie detection and, conse-
quently, liars have more chance to get away with their lies
(Levine & McCornack, 1992). We therefore predicted that
most participants would not lie when claiming the ﬁrst item
(Hypothesis 2). We also expected a linear trend with an in-
creasing amount of lies told as the interview progresses (Hy-
pothesis 3).
To sum up, the current study differs from Shu et al. (2012)
in two ways. First, we examined the relative efﬁcacy of two
deterrence factors in one experiment (evidence and honesty),
whereas Shu et al. only examined honesty. Second, we
examined at which stage of the claim people are more likely
to lie.
METHOD
Participants
A total of 96 participants (40 men and 56 women) took part.
Participants ages ranged from 18 to 67 years with an average
age ofM=29.23 years (SD=12.22, 95% CI [3.16, 4.32]). No
signiﬁcant difference in the distribution of gender, X2(3, 96)
= 2.10, p= .56, Φ=0.15, or in age, F(3, 764) = 1.75, p=1.63,
ηp2 = 5.24, occurred across the four experimental conditions.
Procedure
Participants were recruited via an advert on the university in-
tranet and advertisement leaﬂets. The advert explained that
the experiment would require participants to make a ‘con-
vincing insurance claim’. On arrival at the Psychology de-
partment, participants were informed that they would read
a short vignette about a mock burglary and that their task
would be to make a convincing online insurance claim on
behalf of two students (Rosie and Jack) who ostensibly had
eight items stolen from their apartment. (Because partici-
pants did not experience the burglary themselves, we chose
for the option to let them claim on behalf of someone else.)
Once participants had read the burglary vignette, they re-
ceived instructions outlining the advantages of telling the
truth or lying. With telling the truth, that is, claiming back
the actual value of the items stolen, they would earn £5; with
increasing the actual claim value with £80, they would
earn £10; and with increasing the actual claim value with
£120, they would earn £15. In addition, they could earn
more money if they made the claim convincingly. The
most convincing truth teller could win an extra £50,
and the two highest claims presented convincingly could
win an extra £100 and £75. Therefore, a truth teller could
potentially earn (with winnings) £55; a convincing liar
could potentially earn £115 (with winnings), but an un-
convincing liar could only earn a maximum of £15. This
reﬂects real life in which insurance fraud could lead to
gains. In reality, all participants were paid £15 for their
time (even when they did not increase the actual claim),
all truth tellers were entered into the £50 draw and all liars
were entered into the £75 and £100 draw.
To ensure that participants fully understood the instruc-
tions, the experimenter emphasised to participants that it
would be totally up to them to decide to lie or tell the truth
and that, as in real life, there were potential beneﬁts associ-
ated with their decision to lie. Participants were then given
a printed list of the eight items with the actual cost of the
Deterrence of deception 769
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 30: 768–774 (2016)
item next to it (Laptop £370, Kindle £110, X-box £350, iPod
£200, DVD player £75, iPad £450, MacBook £900 and
iPhone £600.) Additionally, participants were given varying
degrees of evidence that Rosie and Jack owned the items,
broken down as follows: (i) receipt and a photograph for
the Kindle and Laptop, labelled ‘Receipt + photo’ items
below; (ii) receipt only for the X-box and iPod, labelled
‘receipt’ items below; (iii) photograph only for the iPad
and DVD player, labelled ‘photo’ items below; and (iv) no
evidence at all for the iPhone and MacBook, labelled ‘no
evidence’ items below. Participants were informed that the
varying evidence also reﬂected real life, in that claimants
do not always have receipts and photographs for every item
stolen.
All participants were told that they would take part in an
online, verbal, automated insurance claim setting similar to
an automated, verbal, phone call system used by the ﬁnancial
industry, but that instead of being verbally guided by a voice
on the phone, they would be guided via the computer
programme. Participants were required to respond to
questions verbally, and they were informed that their verbal
responses would be recorded and that these would later be
judged for plausibility/likelihood of truthfulness by two
independent raters.
Participants were then given time alone in a room with
the list of items, the actual costs of the items and the
available evidence for the items. They were provided with
paper and informed that they could use their phones to
search on the Internet if they wanted to. They were also
told that apart from claiming for the eight items, which
were actually stolen, they could fabricate claims for addi-
tional items, including cash. They were told to exit the
room and tell the experimenter when they felt that they
were ready to go into the cubicle and complete the online
claim. All participants were informed that because they
were not being tested on memory, they would be able to
take the list of items, actual costs of the items, evidence
and any notes they had made into the cubicle with them.
Participants spent approximately 20minutes preparing be-
fore exiting the room.
They then went into a cubicle where the computer screen
was set up to look like an insurance company home claims
page. It was explained to participants that the programme
would ask about non-cash items and cash money stolen
and that non-cash items referred to anything stolen that was
not cash money. The basic programme was devised to ver-
bally ask participants to claim for each item and record all
the verbal responses given. Participants were guided through
the programme with prompts such as ‘claim for ﬁrst non-cash
item’ and then ‘claim another non-cash item’ or ‘ﬁnish non-
cash item claim’. This allowed participants not only to claim
for the eight items as required but also to add as many items
as they wanted to. Once they went on to the next item, they
could not go back to a previous item to change their claim.
After they had clicked ‘ﬁnish non-cash item claim’, they were
asked if any cash was stolen in the burglary and if so, how
much money, before being required to ‘submit ﬁnal claim’.
This basic programme was adjusted according to the two
experimental factors ‘evidence instruction’ (absent versus
present) and ‘honesty statement’ (absent versus present).
Evidence instruction manipulation
In the evidence instruction absent condition, before partici-
pants started entering their claims, the interviewer’s voice
said: ‘Shortly, I will ask you to individually describe each
non-cash item you are claiming for. Please include the cost
and condition of each item in your description’. Once the
participant clicked start in this condition, a voice said ‘Please
give a full description and cost of the item you are claiming
for’. When the participant clicked ‘ﬁnish non-cash items’,
the voice said ‘Please tell us if any cash was stolen in the
burglary and if so how much was taken’.
In the evidence instruction present condition, before par-
ticipants started entering their claims, the interviewer’s voice
said in addition to what was said in the evidence instruction
absent condition: ‘Additionally it is important that you pro-
vide evidence that the claimant actually owned the item, if
you cannot do this then please explain in as much detail as
possible why no evidence of ownership exists’. Once the
participant clicked ‘start’ in this condition, the interviewer’s
voice then said ‘Please give a full description and cost of the
item you are claiming for, including evidence that the claim-
ant owned the item’, and this was repeated for every non-
cash item they claimed for. When the participant clicked ‘ﬁn-
ish non-cash items’, the interviewer’s voice said ‘Please tell
us if any cash was stolen in the burglary and if so how much
was taken and why the money was there? Again, please in-
clude evidence that the claimant would have had that amount
of cash in the apartment’.
Honesty statement manipulation
In the honesty statement present condition, before starting
entering their claims, participants were told that it is vital
to us (the insurance company) that they would provide the
information to the best of their knowledge and as truthful
as it can be. They were asked to read out the following state-
ment that appeared on the screen: ‘Hello my name is (please
read out your name) and I state that the information I will
give regarding this claim will be totally truthful to the best
of my knowledge’ followed by the interviewer’s voice say-
ing ‘Thank you so much for your honesty, please click to
claim for your ﬁrst item’. In the honesty statement absent
condition, no information was given.
After completing the online claim, participants ﬁlled out a
post-claim questionnaire. The questionnaire asked partici-
pants through an open-ended question to indicate why they
presented the items in the order they did. Each participant
was then de-briefed as to the purpose of the experiment
and given £15 for taking part.
Coding of online verbal responses
For each participant, all verbal responses were transcribed.
From these transcripts, we calculated the order in which
the items were claimed for, the amount of money claimed
for each item and also the amount of cash claimed. In the
Results section, we present the following sets of variables:
1. Amount of cash claimed, which was divided into seven
variables: (i) ‘Receipt +Photo’; (ii) ‘Receipt’; (iii)
‘Photo’; (iv) ‘No Evidence’; (v) ‘new items added’; (vi)
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‘cash’; and (vii) the total of i to vi. For variables i to iv,
we recorded the amount of cash someone over-claimed
or under-claimed. Thus, since the actual costs of the
Macbook was £900, a claim of £950 would result in a
score of £50, and a claim of £850 would result in a score
of £50. (Although we gave under-claiming the costs a
negative £ score, we did not code this as a lie, because
this is not a type of lie an insurance company is worried
about [as it works in their advantage]). For ‘new items
added’, we recorded the total amount of money (in £)
claimed for all the added items combined and for ‘cash’,
we recorded the total amount of cash (in £) claimed.
2. When the ﬁrst lie was told: For each participant, we re-
corded when the ﬁrst lie was told. If the ﬁrst item claimed
was a lie (either a newly added item or an exaggeration of
the costs of one of the eight stolen items), a score of ‘1’
was given; if the ﬁrst lie was told in the second item
claimed, a score of ‘2’ was given; if the ﬁrst lie was told
in the eight item claimed, a score of ‘8’ was given; and so
forth. A missing value was entered for the participants
who did not lie (n=8). This variable could therefore reach
from ‘1’ to ‘8’.
3. How many lies told in each of the ﬁrst eight items
claimed: For the ﬁrst eight items claimed, we calculated
the percentage of participants who lied during that item.
Coding of open-ended post-questionnaire questions
The open-ended responses from the post-claim questionnaire
were transcribed, and the experimenter devised categories to
explain the strategies provided by participants. Each of the
three established categories was put into a copy of Table 4
and given to an independent rater to code responses from
all 96 participants. To ascertain inter-rater reliability, a sec-
ond independent coder rated 20 of the statements. Inter-rater
reliability between the two coders was ICC=1.00 for the
random strategy, ICC=1.00 for the gain trust strategy and
ICC=0.89 for the third category.
Ethics statement
Ethical approval for the study was gained through the Uni-
versity ethics committee in line with the British Psychologi-
cal Society guidelines. Participants provided their written
informed consent to participate in the study.
RESULTS
Total number of lies told
The total number of lies told was M=3.29, SD=2.76. An
ANOVA utilising a 2 (evidence instruction: absent versus
present)× 2 (honesty statement: absent versus present)
between-subjects design and the number of lies as dependent
variable revealed a main effect for evidence instruction, F(1,
92)=10.989, p< .001, d=0.72. Those who did not receive
an evidence instruction told more lies (M=4.19, SD=3.28,
95% CI [3.44, 4.94]) than those who did receive this instruc-
tion (M=2.40, SD=1.72, 95% CI [1.67, 3.17]). The honesty
statement main effect, F(1, 92)= .335, p= .564, d=0.12, and
the evidence instruction×honesty statement interaction effect,
F(1, 92) =2.068, p= .154, ηp2 =0.022, were not signiﬁcant.
Eight participants did not lie. They were equally distrib-
uted over the evidence instruction absent and present condi-
tions (n=4 in each condition); they were also equally distrib-
uted in the honesty statement present (n=5) and absent
(n=3) conditions, X2(1, 96) = .459, p= .498, Φ=0.069.
The amount of money (£) claimed
First, we analysed how much extra money (on top of the ac-
tual costs of the eight stolen items) was claimed for each of
the six types of items presented in Table 1. An ANOVA with
Type of Item as within-subjects factor revealed a signiﬁcant
effect, F(5, 91) = 6.12, p< .001, ηp2 = 0.25. Simple effect tests
revealed that the lowest amounts of extra money were
claimed for the stolen items with evidence, followed by the
stolen items without evidence. Most extra money was made
by adding items to the list of stolen items and by claiming
that cash money was stolen.
Analyses of variance utilising a 2 (evidence instruction:
absent versus present) × 2 (honesty statement: absent ver-
sus present) between-subjects design were carried out with
the six variables reported in Table 1 as dependent
variables. None of the interaction effects were signiﬁcant
(all p’s> .108), and the univariate effects for the two
factors are presented in Table 2.
Regarding the evidence instruction, no difference emerged
in the total amount of money claimed on top of the actual
costs of the stolen items between those who received the in-
struction to provide evidence for their claims and those who
did not receive this instruction (total score in Table 2, which
is the summation of the individual variables). For the indi-
vidual variables, a signiﬁcant difference emerged for the
receipt-evidence variable only. Those who were instructed
to show evidence claimed less extra cash on top of the
actuals costs for the items for which they had a receipt than
those who were not instructed to show a receipt.
Regarding the honesty statement, participants who read
out the honesty statement claimed less extra money on top
of the actual costs of the eight stolen items than those who
did not read out such a statement (total score in Table 2).
For the individual variables, signiﬁcant differences emerged
for the items without receipts. Those who read out the
honesty statement claimed less extra money on top of the ac-
tual costs for the photo-evidence items and no-evidence
items than those who did not read out the honesty statement.
Table 1. Amount of extra money (on top of the actual costs of the
items) in £ claimed
M SD CI
Photo + receipt 16.44a 80.80 0.07, 32.81
Photo 22.09a 72.38 7.43, 36.76
Receipt 16.54a 63.84 3.60, 29.47
No evidence 57.07b 166.88 23.26, 90.89
Added items 91.00c 214.29 47.58, 134.42
Cash 82.86c 306.53 20.76, 144.97
Note:
Only mean scores with a different superscript differ signiﬁcantly from each
other (p< .05).
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In addition, those who read out the honesty statement
claimed less cash money than those who did not read out
such a statement. These ﬁndings showed that the honesty
statement factor deterred participants from lying more than
the evidence instruction, which supports Hypothesis 1.
When was the ﬁrst lie told
For the results presented in this section, the eight participants
who did not lie were excluded. The average rank order of the
ﬁrst lie was M=3.17 (SD=2.19, 95% CI [2.71, 3.63]). A 2
(evidence instruction: absent versus present) × 2 (honesty
statement: absent versus present) between-subjects design
with the moment the ﬁrst lie was told as dependent variable
revealed a main effect for evidence instruction, F(1, 84)
= 6.567, p= .012, d=0.55. Those who were instructed to
show evidence started to lie later (M=3.75, SD=2.35, 95%
95% CI [3.11, 4.39]) than those who were not instructed to
show evidence (M=2.59, SD=1.86, 95% CI [1.96, 3.23]).
The honesty statement main effect, F(1, 84) = 0.124,
p= .726, d=0.07, and the honesty × evidence instruction in-
teraction effect, F(1, 84) = 1.841, p= .179, ηp2 = 0.021, were
not signiﬁcant.
Table 3 (ﬁrst column) shows that 28.4% of participants
started the interview with lying (lied about the ﬁrst item they
presented). This is signiﬁcantly fewer than could be expected
by chance (50%), t(87)=4.47, p< .001, and also signiﬁcantly
fewer than the percentage of lies told across all items (3.29
divided by 8=41.2%), t(87)=2.65, p= .010, supporting
Hypothesis 2. A further 20.5% told their ﬁrst lie when present-
ing the second item, and 18.2% told their ﬁrst lie when present-
ing their third item. Telling the ﬁrst lie after the ﬁfth item was
rare with only 16% of participants doing that. When we
dichotomised this variable and compared the 28.4% of partici-
pants who lied when presenting the ﬁrst itemwith the remaining
participants, Chi-square tests revealed that the 28.4% of partic-
ipants who lied when presenting the ﬁrst item were equally
distributed across the two evidence instruction conditions, X2
(N=88)=1.40, p= .35,Φ=0.17, and the two honesty statement
instruction conditions, X2 (N=88)=1.40, p= .35, Φ=0.17.
Table 3 also shows how many participants lied when
claiming each of the Items 1 to 8 (columns 2–4). In
Hypothesis 3, we predicted a linear trend. A polynomial
test revealed a signiﬁcant linear trend, F(1, 84) = 9.297,
p= .003, ηp2 = 0.10, with all the other tests being not signif-
icant (all F’s< 3.024, all p’s> .086). The results showed
an upwards trend with an increasing amount of lies told
as the interview progressed, supporting Hypothesis 3.
The answers given by the participants in response to the
question why they presented the items in the order they did
are summarised in Table 4 (they could give several responses
so the percentages exceed 100%). Again, we only included
participants who told at least one lie (N=88).
Three main strategies emerged: ﬁrst, using a random ap-
proach, which 60.3% of the participants reported to have
used; second, to gain trust (41.9%), which was achieved in
three ways: report items with receipts ﬁrst, start with telling
the truth and lie later and reporting the cheapest items ﬁrst.
This strategy supports Hypotheses 2 and 3; and third,
15.9% of the participants included items in an order that they
thought ﬁt best in their story.
Table 2. Amount of extra money (on top of the actual costs of the items) in £ claimed as a function of honesty instruction and as a function of
the providing evidence instruction
Providing evidence instruction
Absent Present
M SD CI M SD CI F p d
Total 348.79 721.84 194.13, 503.46 223.21 322.51 72.16, 381.75 1.223 .273 0.24
Photo + receipt 28.52 100.68 5.62, 51.43 4.35 52.54 18.61, 27.23 2.202 .141 0.32
Photo 28.69 79.59 8.49, 48.88 15.50 64.54 4.54, 35.88 0.819 .368 0.18
Receipt 30.28 87.28 12.38, 48.18 2.79 15.29 015.17, 20.65 4.666 .033 0.53
No evidence 59.72 196.13 12.42, 107.02 54.43 133.44 8.96, 103.64 0.010 .919 0.03
Added items 65.44 145.47 3,57, 127.31 116.56 256.18 55.23, 179.08 1.377 .244 0.25
Cash 136.15 422.48 51.60, 220.70 29.58 75.06 53.84, 115.41 3.060 .084 0.43
Honesty instruction
Total 442.76 720.28 283.80, 596.46 135.65 274.98 17.49, 288.73 7.639 .007 0.62
Photo + receipt 26.30 113.40 2.67, 48.97 6.98 20.24 15.66, 29.69 1.329 .252 0.29
Photo 38.36 82.73 17.57, 58.39 6.48 57.47 13.61, 26.37 4.826 .031 0.45
Receipt 23.69 84.05 5.14, 41.32 9.67 34.59 7.93, 27.51 1.112 .294 0.24
No evidence 95.35 137.10 47.67, 143.92 20.36 185.18 26.28, 67.37 4.945 .029 0.47
Added items 102.77 255.76 40.82, 165.90 79.71 167.13 17.98, 140.48 0.300 .585 0.11
Cash 156.38 426.36 68.80, 239.73 12.45 37.68 17.98, 140.48 5.527 .021 0.62
Table 3. Percentage of participants who lied
Percentage of participants who told
First lie on this item A lie when claiming this item
% M SD CI
Item 1 28.4 28.41 45.36 18.8, 38.0
Item 2 20.5 30.68 46.38 21.1, 40.3
Item 3 18.2 43.18 49.82 32.7, 53.7
Item 4 4.5 30.68 46.38 21.1, 40.3
Item 5 12.5 38.64 49.97 28.4, 48.9
Item 6 8.0 42.05 49.65 31.8, 52.3
Item 7 2.3 43.18 49.82 32.6, 53.7
Item 8 5.7 46.59 50.17 36.1, 57.1
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DISCUSSION
Insurers often ask claimants to produce evidence that the
claimed items were actually in the claimants’ possession. Al-
though it is understandable that they do so, it is not enough
to deter claimants from lying. It had some success, because
participants who were asked to show evidence claimed less
additional money (on top of the actual costs) for the items
for which they did have a receipt than those who were not
asked to provide evidence. They also told fewer lies. How-
ever, the important ﬁgure, the total amount of money
claimed, did not differ between those who were asked to pro-
vide evidence and those who were not asked to do this. The
reason why the evidence instruction did not work is that par-
ticipants were not inclined to lie about the items for which
they had evidence for anyway. They lied more about the sto-
len items for which there was no evidence than about the sto-
len items for which there was evidence. And the biggest lies
were told by claiming money for items which were, in fact,
not stolen and by fabricating that cash was stolen. These
ﬁndings reveal a clear strategy used by the participants: Pro-
vide evidence where possible to make the claim convincing
and tell fewer lies perhaps to gain trust; then make a bit of
money on stolen items for which there was no evidence
and make most of the money on items which were not stolen
and on falsely pretending that cash was taken.
Asking claimants before starting to complete the form to
read out a statement that they will be honest, actually made
them more honest, a ﬁnding also obtained by Shu et al.
(2012). The signiﬁcant differences emerged for the items
for which there was no evidence available, possibly, as we
mentioned earlier, because participants were planning to be
honest regarding the items for which there was evidence
anyway.
The ﬁnding that an honesty declaration at the beginning of
a claim leads to more honesty is interesting because it is for
insurers (and, for example, tax authorities) very easy to im-
plement. In fact, many already have an honesty declaration
but insert this at the end of the claim (in between completing
the form and submitting it). Therefore, all insurers need to do
is to insert this declaration at the beginning of the claim
form. Ariely (2012) reported that the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS; US tax collection authority) is reluctant to
move the honesty declaration from the end to the beginning
of the form. The IRS reported that moving the honesty
declaration (and signature) to the beginning would be prob-
lematic because the purpose of the signature is to let the
claimant declare that the provided information was accurate.
Signing a form twice (at the beginning and end) was thought
to be ‘confusing’. In our experiment, the participants simply
read out a declaration, thus even though nothing was legally
signed, just stating they would be honest had a similar effect.
Therefore, we consider that this could be a potential solution
that the IRS and other companies could consider using in
the future.
The present experiment is, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst ex-
periment in which the timing of the lie was examined. We
found that 28.4% of participants lied when presenting the
ﬁrst item. This was a higher percentage than at any other
item, but it should be taken into account that for Item 1, ev-
eryone had the opportunity to lie or tell the truth, which is
not the case for many other items. That is, if someone told
four lies, then the ﬁrst lie could never been told at Items 6,
7 or 8. We also found a trend showing that more lies were
told when the interview progressed. These ﬁndings suggest
that participants prefer to wait with lying. This was accord-
ing to the hypothesis, which was based on the assumptions
that people ﬁrst would like to make themselves familiar with
the situation (e.g. investigator and lie detection tool) and that
people would like to gain trust from the investigator. The
open-ended answers indeed supported mainly the latter ex-
planation (gaining trust). Familiarising themselves with the
investigator was not mentioned but this may be caused by
the fact that the investigator was not visible. The tendency
of a large group of participants to start with telling the truth
could beneﬁt investigators. For them, it is important to real-
ise that lies are unlikely to be told straight at the beginning of
the interview.
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATION
Three methodological issues deserve mentioning. We did
not include a condition in the design in which participants
read the honesty statement after completing the form (but be-
fore submitting it). This is the current practice amongst in-
surers because it explicitly links the claimant with the
form, which is needed for legal reasons. We did not include
this condition because Shu et al. (2012) found no effect for
this condition in terms of deterrence, which is not surprising.
Lying on an insurance claim form is a deliberate act and,
once people have carried out that deliberate act, they are un-
likely to change their mind about this when they declare that
they ﬁlled in the form honestly. We did not see merits of rep-
licating the ‘common sense’ null-effect of Shu et al.
We let participants complete a form on behalf of someone
else rather than asking them to pretend that their own home
was burgled. We did not ask participants the latter
because we expected that some participants would have
found this difﬁcult to do (and to lie on the form) for ethical
Table 4. Reported strategies for presenting the items in a certain order
Why did you report items in that order?
N %
Random (n= 35)/mix in lies and truths (n= 18) 53 60.3
To gain trust: Items with receipt ﬁrst (n= 23)/told truths at beginning
and lies later (n= 11)/price order least to most to gain trust (n= 3)
40 41.9
According to gender (Rosie or Jack’s items) or location of items in story 14 15.9
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reasons, even for the sake of the experiment. We thought that
participants would ﬁnd it ethically less problematic to lie on
behalf of someone else for the sake of the experiment. It
could well be that our decision to let participants complete
the form on behalf of someone else has affected the fre-
quency and extent of lying. Perhaps people ﬁnd it easier to
justify lying for someone else than for themselves. However,
we were not interested in the frequency or extent of lying per
se. We were interested in the effect of the two deterrence
factors on lying and when the lies would be told. We cannot
think of a theoretical reason as to why these issues are
affected by completing a form for oneself or on behalf of
someone else.
In our experiment, the participants took part in an online,
verbal, automated insurance claim setting similar to an auto-
mated, verbal, phone call system used by the ﬁnancial indus-
try (e.g. banks and insurance companies). The question
arises whether our ﬁndings would be replicated if claimants
would ﬁll out a written form, a method also used by the
ﬁnancial industry. This is relevant because someone could
argue that written reports feel more distant and therefore
make it easier for someone to disengage his or her internal
controls (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli,
1996). Shu et al. (2012) raised this very issue and therefore
used written reports to test the honesty statement hypothesis.
They obtained the same ﬁndings as we did, suggesting that
an honesty statement also works in written statements.
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